We consider an economy where production may use labor of two different skill levels. Workers are heterogeneous and, by investing in education, self-select into one of the two skills. Ex-ante, when firms choose their investments in physical capital, they do not know the level of human capital prevailing in the labor market they will be active in. We prove existence and constrained inefficiency of competitive equilibria, which are always characterized by overeducation. An increase in total expected surplus can be obtained by shrinking, at the margin, the set of workers investing in high skills. This can be implemented by imposing taxes on the cost of investing in high skills or by imposing a progressive labor earning tax.
Introduction
Existence and effects of the externalities related to the investments in human capital (HC) have been important topics of research for many years. 1 A puzzling feature of this literature is that the existence and quantitative relevance of HC relatedand positive -externalities are often taken for granted both in the theoretical analysis and for policy purposes. Indeed, these are key assumptions of many important economic models and are often used as justifications for high public subsidies to schooling. Still, the empirical evidence for their existence is far from compelling. 2 Moreover, there is no canonical theory explaining the precise mechanism generating them. Since its nature dictates the appropriate policy interventions, if any, a better understanding of this issue has direct policy relevance.
The main aim of this paper is to contribute to the understanding of the microeconomic foundations of HC market externalities. The literature proposes two main mechanisms explaining them. The first is based on the existence of knowledge spillovers creating a wedge between private and social returns to HC. The second rests on the existence of distortions creating pecuniary externalities. Here, we are only concerned with this last approach. Our main focus is on the efficiency properties of equilibria. We consider a Roy's (1951) model with schooling choices at both the intensive and the extensive margin: workers choose both their type of HC (low/high skill) and the quantity of HC of a given type in terms of efficiency units. Markets are perfectly competitive. We show that, at the equilibrium, the set of workers' types investing in high skills is always larger than the constrained efficient one. Hence, equilibrium overeducation always holds.
In the literature, the term "over/undereducation" takes on several different meanings. 3 Thus, it is worthwhile to clarify right away our precise use of this notion. A first criterion compares the skills of a worker with the ones actually required for the job she/he performs. 4 According to a second definition, one compares type and quantity of HC of a worker with their constrained efficient values. 5 The two notions are clearly conceptually distinct, look at different phenomena and have different policy implications. In our economies, since, at the equilibrium, each worker is employed in the job he/she is qualified for, there is never any mismatch between 1 Fairly recent surveys discussing many of the relevant issues are Lange and Toppel (2006) and Moretti (2004) . 2 For instance, Heckman et al. (1996) and Acemoglu and Angrist (2001) reach a negative conclusion for the U.S.. 3 See, for instance, Bishop (1993) . 4 See, for instance, Leuven and Oosterbeek (2011) and McGuinness (2006) . 5 This is the definition used in Acemoglu (1996) , where workers's choices are just at the intensive margin, and in Charlot and Decreuse (2005) and Mendolicchio et al. (2012b) , where choices are just at the extensive margin. workers and jobs, i.e., by assumption, there cannot be overeducation according to the first notion. On the other hand, the second definition encompasses two different types of inefficiencies: (a) overeducation at the extensive margin when the set of workers acquiring high skill HC is larger than the (constrained) efficient set; (b) overeducation at the intensive margin when each worker acquires too much HC of a given type. Evidently, the two possible kinds of undereducation are defined symmetrically. A precise statement of our main welfare result is that we always have equilibrium overeducation at the extensive margin, while the allocation is always constrained efficient at the intensive margin, given the choices at the other margin.
Let's now briefly summarize the main features of the economies considered in this paper. They have four key properties: self-selection of workers into distinct labor markets requiring different skill levels; asymmetric information on the innate ability of the workers, which affects their productivities on the job and is observable only ex-post; lack of contractibility between firms and workers; elastic investments in both physical and human capital. Due to the first three features, firms must base their investment choices on their expectations on workers' ability in each labor market. The elasticity of their investments provides the channel of transmission from changes in the composition of the labor force in terms of HC to equilibrium wages and social welfare. These changes in composition play a key role in our analysis and are a feature common to all the Roy's models. 6 In these models, ex-ante heterogeneous agents, through their schooling choices, self-select into distinct labor markets, taking into account their comparative advantages. Hence, the composition of the labor force in the different markets typically differ both for observable and non observable variables. Assume that firms' investments are made ex-ante, based on the joint distribution of the (observable) schooling characteristics and of the (ex-ante unobservable) characteristics of the future labor force. This creates a potential channel to generate an external effect of the individual schooling choices. To fix ideas, consider an economy with two distinct labor markets, for high school and college graduates, respectively. Each type of skills is used in a separate production process. Workers are heterogeneous in terms of their innate ability and, at each equilibrium, the ones investing in high skills are comparatively more productive in both jobs. Then, the marginal individual investing in high skills is, at once, the most productive low skill worker and the least productive high skill one. Consider an increase in the subsidies to the direct cost of college education. As a first order effect, this increases the supply of college educated workers. Consequently, the composition of the two labor forces in terms of the other relevant, and unobservable, individual characteristics changes. Under several types of market imperfections, this may induce a negative impact on welfare.
Several previous papers have pointed out that, with market imperfections, Roy's models can exhibit equilibrium overeducation due to the mechanism just described. Charlot and Decreuse (2005) and Mendolicchio et al. (2012b) consider a two sector, random matching model where workers endogenously choose their level of skill. An increase in the size of the set of agents investing in higher education may reduce the average level of skills of both college and high school graduates. This has an adverse effect on the creation of vacancies in the two sectors and, at least for some classes of economies, may reduce total surplus. Hence, overeducation holds. In a related framework, Holzner and Launov (2010) provide a structural estimate of a random search model using German data. Their main conclusion is that the German economy is characterized by a significant level of overinvestment in high skills. Compared to our (2010b) paper, they stress a different mechanism inducing overeducation, because they focus on the role of workers' uncertainty on their future earnings and employment paths. They also adopt a different notion of social welfare, measured by output, while we use expected total surplus. Still, their results are interesting for our purposes because they provide an explicit, quantitative exercise showing that overeducation phenomena can actually be empirically relevant.
In our economies, the composition effect unambiguously entails equilibrium overeducation if, when the set of agents acquiring high skills enlarges, the average ability of the workers in both sectors decreases, so that the expected productivities of both pools of workers decrease. 7 This is a key feature of our model and its empirical relevance has been analyzed in several papers. For instance, Juhn et al. (2005) interpret their results as evidence of a negligible effect of changes in the share of college educated cohorts on the relevant quality of the labor force. More recent contributions suggest instead that there is an economically significant, and negative, relation between college enrollment and average quality of the graduates. In particular, this is established for the US in Carneiro and Lee (2011), using the results for several different tests of ability. 8 Hence, our assumption is consistent with at least some of the empirical evidence. 7 As just mentioned, this assumption is implicit in Charlot and Decreuse (2005) and Mendolicchio et al. (2012a) . Mendolicchio et al. (2012b) provides a general analysis of efficiency in Roy's models with random matching encompassing this case. 8 According to their results, the effect of changes in the share of college attendees on the ability (measured by standardized quantitative literacy scores) of the high school graduates who do not attend college is actually not significant. It would be fairly straightforward to reformulate our model to make it coherent with this empirical evidence. On this issue, the extensive literature on the difference between marginal and average returns to education is also relevant, see Carneiro et al. (2001 . For Italy, Oppedisano (2011) uses a different identification strategy, based on the introduction of new universities. Her results indicate that the effect of the reduction of college costs
The overeducation results discussed above should be contrasted with the conclusion obtained by Acemoglu (1996) , the classical reference on HC related pecuniary externalities. He considers a frictional economy where workers and firms invest in human and physical capital, respectively, before they are randomly matched. Thus, their investments depend upon the distribution of the investments of their potential future partners. Due to the income allocation mechanism, 9 agents do not fully appropriate the marginal returns of their irreversible investments. This hold-up problem generates undereducation at the equilibrium, so that an increase in the investments of workers (and/or of firms) is always welfare improving. This result rests crucially on the adoption of a pure efficiency unit set-up. In a companion paper (2012a), we study a similar framework with frictional labor markets, but with two separate sectors using different kinds of HC, i.e., we adopt a Roy's model with elastic investments in both human and physical capital. We establish that the equilibrium allocations are always characterized by underinvestment in the amount of physical capital and in educational effort, i.e., in the investments at the intensive margin. Compared to the constrained efficient allocation, the equilibrium investments in high skills can be either above or below their efficient levels at the extensive margin. Equilibrium overeducation holds for some sets of economies in the sense that we can increase total surplus by shrinking the set of agents investing in high skills.
In this paper, we consider perfectly competitive spot labor markets. The only distortion in the economy is that firms choose their investments observing the skill type of the workers active in the labor markets they face, but without knowing the level of their innate ability, which affects the actual amount of HC they acquire. Clearly, the set-up adopted here is similar to the one of Mendolicchio et al. (2012a) . There is, however, one important difference in the structure of the economy and, consequently, in the results. In (2012a), we have at once two distortions acting on welfare in opposite directions. Their interaction and their quantitative impacts determine the "sign" of the inefficiency. To the contrary, here investments at the intensive margin are always constrained efficient and the sign of the inefficiency at the extensive margin is always well-defined: overeducation holds. Hence, the inefficiency results are much sharper. To consider a simpler model with just one distortion also allows us to make much more transparent the basic mechanism by which the composition effect determines constrained inefficiency.
To focus on an environment with competitive wage setting has two additional advantages. First, we can avoid all the issues related to the random-matching has been to enlarge the set of attendees adding individuals with low performances at the college level. 9 Income distribution takes place via a Nash bargaining process after a worker is randomly matched with a firm.
with bargaining set-up. Acemoglu (1996) and our (2012a) paper both consider full employment models with ex-post bargaining wage setting, so they do not fit properly into the search literature. Still, one might wonder how robust are the results obtained there once a directed, instead of random, search mechanism is introduced. Secondly, to consider perfectly competitive labor markets makes easier to build a bridge between our results and the literature on optimal taxation in economies with HC, which is often concerned with this kind of economies. To see why, let's first sketch our policy results. In the last section, we consider some policy instruments that can be adopted to mitigate the loss of (constrained) efficiency. First, we show that taxes on the direct costs of education in high skills can reduce the overinvestment problem. Since all the agents have quasi-linear preferences, these taxes do not affect their choices at the intensive margin. They have a positive effect on welfare (measured by total surplus) because of the composition effect. Secondly, we show that earning taxes may have a positive welfare effect, too. In particular, some small degree of progressivity may be welfare improving. This is because an higher marginal tax rate on high-skill, high-wage earnings shrinks the set of people investing in these skills. Of course, positive marginal tax rates have a negative incentive effect on the effort invested in acquiring HC. However, when the initial tax rate (or the elasticity of the labor supply) is sufficiently small, the negative impact on welfare of the -distortionary -earning tax is dominated by its positive impact via the composition effect. These results are best seen as a way to understand the effects of the distortion we are considering, rather than as a contribution to the literature on the optimal taxation in economies with HC, 10 first of all, because we assume that workers have quasi-linear preferences. This is convenient for analytical simplicity and because it allows us to focus exclusively on our main concern, the efficiency issues. On the downside, quasi-linearity of preferences rules out any meaningful consideration of the distributional issues which are obviously important for HC related policies. This notwithstanding, our results may be of some interest for this literature, too, because they show that some of the conclusions reached in pure efficiency unit models may fail to hold in Roy's economies. Since the effect on welfare of the composition effect does not depend upon the specification of the utility function, this has to be true for general preferences. Hence, it would be important to check the sensitivity of the results of the optimal taxations literature to different specifications of the notion of HC. An exhaustive analysis of this issue is beyond the scope of this paper.
Our interest in the welfare effects of earning taxes also motivates our analysis of economies with elastic labor supply. The composition effect is clearly at play in any version of the Roy's model. The elasticity of the investments in physical capital generates the channel allowing changes of the labor force composition to affect the wages of the inframarginal workers, hence it is key to create the externality effect. The elasticity of the labor supply (or, in our preferred interpretation, of the effort in the acquisition of HC) plays no role in the inefficiency results. However, once we consider distortionary taxes, we need to allow for an elastic labor supply, because our point is to show that they can still be welfare improving. Evidently, this require a nonzero elasticity of the labor supply. It follows that, given our purposes, the set-up of the model is parsimonious.
The structure of the paper is the following. Section 2 describes the class of economies, the notion of equilibrium and presents existence and main properties of the equilibrium. Section 3 is the core of the paper and contains the welfare analysis. In Section 4, we consider some policies implementing welfare improvements. Some final considerations follow.
The model
We now formalize the description of the class of economies sketched above. 
They are identical within each island, i.e., with respect to the index i, but heterogeneous across islands, because of the parameter δ , whose realization in a given island is, ex-ante, private information of the workers. This parameter can be interpreted as describing their "innate ability" and it affects the workers' investments in HC. By their schooling choices, workers self-select into one of the two labor markets characterized by different skills. To fix ideas, it is convenient to focus on the most obvious case where workers are either skilled, denoted by a subscript s, or unskilled, denoted by u. We will use t (as in type) to refer to a generic skill level. We may think of an agent with t = s as a college graduate, of one with t = u as having a high school diploma. Given their choice of a skill type, workers then choose their optimal level of HC. Their choices at the extensive margin induce a partition ∆ ≡ {∆ u , ∆ s }, with workers of type δ acquiring high skills if and only if δ ∈ ∆ s . In the sequel, given a partition ∆, we will use δ t ∈ ∆ t to refer to the realization of δ with δ ∈ ∆ t .
There is a large number of potential firms, denoted by f , endowed with the same technology. They may use one or both of two different production processes.
The first uses capital and skilled labor. The second, capital and unskilled labor. Production takes place under constant returns to scale, and each firm has produc-
Hence, there are two perfectly substitutable production processes, one using skilled labor and one type of physical capital, the other using unskilled labor inputs. To simplify, but without any loss of generality, we assume that the unit price of capital goods (which is anyway exogenous) is invariant across t, and equal to 1. The price of output is also fixed and equal to one. Furthermore, we assume that production using skilled labor has higher total factor productivity, i.e., that A s > A u . What really matters is that, for a given level of inputs, the production process using skilled labor is more valuable, i.e., that, for
This can happen because A s > A u or because the two processes produce different commodities and the one obtained using skilled labor has an higher price. For notational convenience, we fix p s = p u = 1 and assume A s > A u .
Before choosing their investments in physical capital, firms are matched with one local labor market for one, or both, the skills levels. 12 Firms' decisions take place in two stages. In the first period, an interval [0, 1] of firms, endowed with the Lebesgue measure, is matched with an island. These firms learn the types of workers they will be able to hire (i.e., if t = s or t = u), and the equilibrium partition ∆. However, they do not know the actual realization δ t ∈ ∆ t . In the same period, firms choose their optimal investments K f t , t = u, s. In the second stage, the actual levels of HC of the workers become observable, labor markets open and clear at the competitive wages and production takes place. This is the formal description of firms's behavior. The existence of a set of islands is a standard device to guarantee that, at the equilibrium, the expected distribution of HC for each skill coincides with the actual distribution, so that expectations are rational. In our specific framework, we can rationalize it assuming that firms choose their locations, and their irreversible investments, after observing the types of workers available in the different islands. However, they are able to observe their actual level of HC only after their investments are made, i.e., when the workers are actually hired. Since (location specific) investments in physical capital are irreversible, firms have no incentive to move after the labor markets have opened. In the specification used here, we assume that the moving costs for workers are sufficiently high, so that workers have no incentive to move across islands either. This is a polar case and we focus on it for simplicity. What is essential is that, for the workers, the cost to move across islands is sufficiently high, so that the actual distribution of the levels of HC varies across locations. This is necessary to guarantee that firms face uncertainty. 13 In the sequel, we will show that, at each equilibrium,
for some threshold δ , so that the partition ∆ can be written ∆(δ ) and it can be directly identified with δ . Therefore, ex-ante, given the equilibrium wage map w (.) ≡ {w u (.) , w s (.)} and δ , each firm chooses its optimal plan solving the optimization problem
where E(. |δ ) is the conditional expectation of its argument with respect to the partition induced by the threshold
Evidently, they are f −invariant. Given the time-structure of the economy, the demand for capital goods does not depend upon the realization (δ u , δ s ) , while, in general, the demand for labor depends upon this realization and, indirectly, upon the partition ∆(δ ), because this affects the level of physical capital. Consider now the workers. They self-select into one of the two labor markets characterized by different skills and choose their optimal levels of HC. Since we are just interested in efficiency issues, it is convenient to impose that individual preferences are described by a quasi-linear utility function, and, without any essential loss of generality, we set U (C t , h t ) = C t − 1 δ h 1+Γ t 1+Γ . Our preferred interpretation is that each worker inelastically supplies one unit of time. h t is his effort in the acquisition of HC, which converts 1-to-1 into efficiency units of labor of skill t, for t = u, s. Acquisition of high skills requires effort, h s , and a direct cost T. 15 Hence, C s = w s h s − T, while C u = w u h u . The parameter δ affects the marginal disutility of effort and, consequently, all the choices related to the investment in HC. To fix ideas, we may think of it as a parameter defining the innate ability of the individuals. This utility function delivers two convenient properties: first, it allows for a simple parameterization of the marginal disutility of effort, hence of the optimal 13 If these costs were nil, equilibrium wages would be island-invariant, for each t. Then, at the equilibrium, the economy would reduce to a standard Arrow-Debreu economy and the first fundamental theorem of welfare would apply.
14 Workers with δ = δ are actually indifferent between the two skills. Without loss of generality, we assume that they choose t = s. 15 Similar results would hold if there were time costs, too.
level of HC across islands. Secondly, it allows us to explicitly compute the supply function of HC. 16 For future reference, we study workers' optimal behavior given a vector of taxes ξ ≡ (τ u , τ s , ∆T ) , where τ t is the marginal tax rate on labor income in sector t. ∆T are taxes (or subsidies) on the direct costs of education in the high skills. Since, at the equilibrium, labor income is always higher for the workers in sector s, (τ u , τ s ) , with τ s > τ u , describes the usual progressive, step-linear, labor income tax system.
Notice that, given the characteristics of the production function, for each t and each pair (δ u , δ s ), w t only depends upon the investments in capital of type t and the realization δ t . Hence, workers face no actual uncertainty, and we can write the wage equilibrium maps as w(δ u , δ s ; δ , ξ ) ≡ {w u (δ u ; δ , ξ ), w s (δ s ; δ , ξ )}, giving the equilibrium wages associated with the partition ∆(δ ) and the realization (δ u , δ s ) ∈ ∆ u (δ ) × ∆ s (δ ). Within each island, workers are identical, thus we will mostly omit the index i. Their choices can be described considering first their optimal solution to the two optimization problems
for t = u, s. Let H t δ ; δ , ξ be the supply function, conditional on t. Let V t (δ ; δ , ξ ) be the associated value functions. Evidently, a worker acquires HC of type s if and only if V s δ ; δ , ξ ≥ V u δ ; δ , ξ . Equilibrium is defined by market clearing and individual optimization, under the assumption that expectations are rational. Definition 1. An equilibrium is a measurable partition ∆ δ and a wage map
for each pair (δ u , δ s ) and each t, H t δ ; δ , ξ = L t (w t (.) ; δ ). 16 Given the structure of production, similar results hold for a more general class of quasi-linear utility functions, with a general, strictly convex function
Evidently, (i − ii) impose individual optimization. (iii) imposes that the utility of a worker with δ ∈ ∆ s δ is at least as large if he acquires high skills than if he invests in low skills. (iv) imposes the analogous condition for unskilled workers. (v) are the market clearing conditions. 17 For this economy, an equilibrium exists. We start with an arbitrary threshold δ and an arbitrary pair of firm-invariant investments, K. We then compute the wage equilibrium maps conditional on ( δ , K), w( δ , K). Next, given δ , we can use the map w( δ , K) to determine the optimal investments in physical capital, contingent on the threshold. They are described by a function K(δ ). Finally, the map w(δ , K(δ )) can be used to find the actual equilibrium threshold.
The equilibrium threshold is defined by the condition
Using the wage maps conditional on an arbitrary threshold (see (A3) in Appendix), we can rewrite this equality as (1) defines an equilibrium threshold δ . Hence, to establish the existence of an equilibrium we need two properties. First, we need to show that the equilibrium partition has indeed structure ∆ s (δ ) = [δ , d], as postulated above. Secondly, a solution to F(δ ) = 0 must exist. The proof is straightforward and the details are in Appendix. There, we also establish uniqueness and comparative statics of the equilibrium. These additional properties do not hold in general. Indeed, numerical examples show that, for some values of the parameters, F(.) is not strictly monotonic, so that there are several equilibria, at least for some values of T. A sufficient condition for uniqueness of the solution to F(δ ) = 0 is that the total factor productivity in sector s is sufficiently larger than the one in sector u. 18 Proposition 1 presents our existence and uniqueness results, taking as a benchmark the economy with a flat labor income tax and no taxes on the direct costs of education. 17 Since there is a measure 1 of identical workers and firms on each labor market, it would be pedantic to distinguish between individual and aggregate demand and supply. 18 There are other alternative sufficient conditions delivering the same property.
there is a set (T , T ) such that, for each T with bT 1−τ ∈ (T , T ), there is an equilibrium with threshold δ (ξ ) ∈ d, d ; (b) given A u , there is A s such that, for each A s > A s , the equilibrium is unique and described by a C 1 function satisfying
From (A3) in Appendix, at each equilibrium, the wages (and earnings) of the skilled workers are always strictly larger than the ones of the low skilled agents. Hence, any skill-conditional earning tax profile (τ u , τ s ) is equivalent to the standard tax system with variable marginal tax rates, as we have claimed above.
Constrained inefficiency of equilibria
Our main purpose is to analyze the efficiency properties of the equilibria. Their Pareto inefficiency is self-evident since firms' investments are invariant with respect to the realizations (δ u , δ s ). This is due to the lack of contractibility of investments and it reflects the basic structure of the economy. It is more interesting to consider the efficiency properties of the economy taking as reference point a notion of constrained optimal (CO) allocation. We adopt the usual fiction of a benevolent planner maximizing total expected surplus under the appropriate constraints, reflecting the fundamental structure of the economy. In our set-up, this is the constraint that investments in physical capital must be selected ex-ante, before firms are actually matched with labor markets, so that they must be (δ u , δ s ) −invariant. The objective function of the social planner is E(W (.)), the total expected surplus: 19
where µ t ( ∆) is the measure of agents of type t. Evidently, for each t,
is the expected surplus (including education costs) for the interval of firms matched with an island with δ ∈ ∆ t . Bear in mind that E(W (.)) coincides with the actual total surplus. The policy instruments of the planner are two maps { L u (δ u ), L s (δ s )} fixing the labor inputs for each δ u and δ s , the investments in physical capital, { K u , K s }, and a measurable partition ∆. It is fairly intuitive that the CO partition always has structure
]} so that it can be identified with a threshold δ . We establish two results: first agents' choices at the intensive margin are always at their efficient values, conditional on the equilibrium partition ∆(δ ). However, the equilibrium threshold is always different from the efficient one, so that inefficiency is entirely due to the agents' choices at the extensive margin. Second, and more relevant in terms of policy implications, the equilibrium threshold is always too low, so that equilibria are always characterized by overeducation. They are summarized in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2. Under the maintained assumptions, there is a CO allocation with threshold δ . Any equilibrium allocation with δ ∈ (d, d) is CO if and only if δ = δ . For each economy, δ < δ , so that overeducation holds.
The details of the proof are in the Appendix. The core of the argument is the following. Since, at each equilibrium, expected profits are zero, total expected surplus, given any arbitrary threshold δ , can be also written, at ξ = 0, as
In Appendix we show that, conditional on the threshold, the surplus is at its maximum. Hence, to establish the constrained inefficiency of equilibria, we just need to evaluate
The first term is zero, by definition of δ . This is the private gain from investing in high skills for the workers at the margin. The second component measures the effects of the change in the composition of the labor force on the wages, and, hence, on the utilities of the inframarginal workers. This is the external effect. From (A4) in Appendix, for each t, V t (δ ; δ ) is increasing in E(δ
is the expectation of a strictly increasing function of δ ,
> 0, for each t, so that, at each equilibrium, E(W ( δ )) is increasing in the value of the threshold.
Hence, equilibria are always characterized by overeducation. The basic intuition is simple. When, at the margin, a set of workers switches from sector s to sector u, this increases the expected HC in both sectors, therefore decreasing the expected equilibrium wages. This stimulates investments in physical capital and, in turn, it has a positive effect on the equilibrium wages for all the inframarginal workers. Given that workers optimally self-select into the two labor markets, the decrease in the wage rate for the workers switching sector is exactly compensated by their schooling costs. Hence, at the equilibrium, an increase in the threshold has always a positive effect on welfare. These properties can be easily established using the results reported in Appendix. In particular, from (A2) in Appendix, an increase in the value of the threshold δ has always a positive effect on the investments in physical capital in each sector. From (A3), the equilibrium wages of the inframarginal workers are also increasing in the threshold. This is a second order effect due to the change in the associated investments in physical capital. That's why the chain of causation from a change in the threshold to a welfare improvement is via the investments in physical capital. Therefore, some degree of elasticity of these investments is a crucial assumption. It is worthwhile to notice an additional property of equilibria. Investments in high skills are productive as long as A s > A u . However, positive investments in these skills prevail even at the limit, when A s = A u , since, as it is easy to check, lim δ →d f ( δ ) > 0, for each A s ≥ A u . Hence, for T sufficiently small, the equilibrium threshold satisfies δ < d, for each A s ≥ A u . At the limit, to invest in high skills is socially unproductive, but it is still individually profitable, because it allows to enter a sector where investments in physical capital are higher and, therefore, labor earnings are also higher. In this limit case, investments in HC are not directly productive, and the economy has some resemblance with the pure signalling model. However, even at this limit, the mechanism is quite different, because, contrary to that model, firms can actually learn directly the ability of the workers they hire. Moreover, as just mentioned, the composition of the labor force matters because its effect on physical investments. More relevant, in the general case with A s > A u , investments in HC are directly productive, so that the arguments used to dismiss signalling models 20 do not apply. 20 For instance, the arguments based on preemptive offers, see Swinkels (1999), do not apply. For a discussion of signalling models, see Weiss (1995).
Tax policies and welfare
Proposition 2 clearly implies that any policy affecting just the value of the threshold can be used to obtain a welfare improvement. Since preferences are quasi-linear, taxes on the direct cost of education, ∆T > 0, have no effect on the choices at the intensive margin, while they can affect in the appropriate way the ones at the extensive margin and, therefore, the composition of the labor force in terms of HC. When F(.) is increasing in the threshold, an appropriate, positive value of ∆T is welfare improving since it moves δ up. Therefore, the constrained optimal allocation can be implemented choosing an appropriate (and positive) value ∆T, so that the equilibrium threshold coincides with the CO one. Fig. 1 shows the values of the equilibrium thresholds (the solid curve on top) and the CO thresholds (the dashed curve lying below) for a specific economy, 21 corresponding to different levels of T.
Set of agents overinvesting in education ∆
bT Figure 1 For each value of the cost of education T, the equilibrium value δ F is below the constrained efficient level δ CO . Hence, for each T, overeducation holds. For each T, the vertical distance between the two curves (measured at the value of δ CO ) determines the value of ∆T required to implement the constrained efficient allocation as an equilibrium. 21 The parameters are α = Less obvious is that a small increase in the marginal tax rate on high earnings (the ones of the high skilled people) can also be welfare improving. Conditional on the threshold, private investments are at their optimal level. Hence, an increase in the marginal tax rate always has a direct (i.e., given the threshold) negative impact on surplus. However, it may have an indirect positive effect due to the induced change of the equilibrium threshold. To put it differently: an increase in the marginal tax rate distorts the supply of HC at the intensive margin, but it can improve welfare because of its effects on the overall composition of the labor force, i.e., at the extensive margin. An increase in the marginal rate on high income individuals has a negative direct incentive effect, but a positive composition effect, because it moves up the equilibrium threshold, so that the sign of the change in welfare is, in general, indeterminate. For a perfectly inelastic supply function, an increase in the marginal tax rate has no negative incentive effect. It has a strictly positive composition effect because the choice at the extensive margin depends upon the difference between the net wages in the two sectors. Hence, the effect on welfare is positive. By continuity, an increase in the marginal tax rate for high labor income is welfare improving whenever the elasticity of the supply function is sufficiently small. The same result holds if the initial tax rate is sufficiently small. On the other hand, an increase in the marginal tax rate on the low income workers has a negative incentive and composition effect. Hence, it has, unambiguously, a negative impact on welfare.
In the next two propositions, we take as a benchmark an economy with no taxes and subsidies on the direct costs of education and with a sufficiently small flat earning tax. Assume that workers and firms choose their optimal behavior given a policy vector ξ . E(W (ξ )) is the total expected surplus at the equilibrium associated with ξ . Once again, we can ignore expected profits as a component of total surplus, since they are always zero, at the equilibrium. Using (A4) in Appendix, total expected surplus (including the tax revenues R (ξ )) is given by
where, for each t, µ t δ (ξ ) is the measure of the set of agents investing in skill t,
i.e., µ s δ (ξ ) = (d − δ (ξ )), and µ u δ (ξ ) = δ (ξ ) − d .
Proposition 3.
Consider an equilibrium associated with ξ = τ, τ, ∆T , ∆T = 0, τ > 0 and sufficiently small. Also, assume that
d∆T > 0 increases total surplus, ii. dτ u > 0 decreases total surplus, iii.
dτ s > 0 increases total surplus.
The proof is in Appendix. The condition ∂ f (.) ∂ δ | δ > 0 determines the comparative statics of the equilibrium threshold, and it guarantees that
∂ ∆T > 0. As established in Proposition 1 above, it always holds if the ratio A s /A u is sufficiently large. A value τ not "too large" is sufficient to guarantee that
> 0 at the equilibrium threshold δ (ξ ). Remember that E(W (ξ )) includes tax revenues. Since the wage rate is always larger in sector s, they are decreasing in the threshold. For τ sufficiently large, the behavior of the tax revenues is the dominant component of E(W (ξ )) and it may be
Sufficiently small values of τ rule out this possibility and guarantee that
> 0. These conditions are sufficient to establish (i − ii). Property (iii) requires an additional restriction: τ (or, alternatively, 1 Γ ) must be sufficiently small, because, for general values of the parameters, the sign of
∂ τ s is indeterminate. Consider now policies where reductions in the income taxes are financed through taxes on the direct costs of education, or by revenue neutral changes (dτ s , dτ u ). and (dτ t , d∆T ) . Then, i.
(dτ s , −dτ u ) >> 0 increases total surplus, ii.
(−dτ u , d∆T ) >> 0 increases total surplus, iii.
(−dτ s , d∆T ) >> 0 increases total surplus.
The proof is, once again, in Appendix. The restriction Γ 1+Γ > τ implies that, given the value of the threshold, in each sector we are on the increasing part of the Laffer's curve. The Proposition shows that it may be welfare improving to move from a flat income tax to a progressive one. A welfare improvement also follows by a decrease in the marginal tax rate on "low" labor incomes, financed by increasing taxes on the direct costs of education. This is quite intuitive, since the two tax changes have positive effects both at the extensive and at the intensive margins. Consider now a decrease in the marginal tax rate on "high" labor incomes, similarly financed. Now, the two tax changes have opposite effects on the choices at the extensive margin, since d∆T > 0 moves up the equilibrium threshold, while dτ s < 0 does the opposite. In Appendix, we show that the net effect on welfare is positive, for sufficiently small tax rates.
Conclusions
We have established how asymmetric information and lack of contractibility may generate negative pecuniary externalities related to HC accumulation. One of the key features of the economy is that skills are not perfectly fungible. We consider the polar case where the two skills are used in distinct production processes. However, the results are robust to more general specifications of the production process. The essential point is that workers, by choosing their education, sort themselves into distinct labor markets. This is consistent with the Roy's approach. When this happens, overeducation may hold at equilibrium. To the contrary, in a pure efficiency unit model, without sorting and with perfectly competitive spot labor markets, equilibrium allocations are always constrained efficient.
Our results illustrate the trade-off which exists between extensive and intensive accumulation of HC. When agents are heterogeneous and different skills are used in production, to enlarge the set of agents with high skills may imply a reduction of the (across labor markets) average level of high skills HC. Some of the available empirical evidence supports the relevance of this phenomenon. If the distribution of HC for a given skill matters, this may have adverse welfare effects. Simple policy interventions can internalize the externality for the workers, implementing the constrained efficient allocations.
Several previous papers have enlightened the possible impact on welfare of the composition effect in Roy's models. The precise mechanism at play in those papers is, however, different because of the simultaneous presence of other distortions, due to the bargaining income allocation set-up. To consider the case of perfectly competitive labor markets allows us to focus in a more transparent way on the role of the composition effect and may have some interest for the optimal taxation literature.
We just focus on economies with purely pecuniary externalities. It is quite intuitive that similar phenomena induced by the composition effect may take place in economies where investments in HC generate technological externalities, provided that the spillover effects are not homogeneous across the different types of HC.
Three additional features of our results should be stressed. First, workers' investment choices affect social welfare through their impact on the investments in physical capital. Workers' choices at the extensive margin affect the distribution of HC and, consequently, firms' investments. Secondly, there is asymmetric information ex-ante, because workers know their ability (i.e., the value of their δ ) while firms do not know its value for the workers they will actually hire. However, this asymmetry disappears ex-post, but before hiring occurs. Once labor markets open, firms perfectly observe the actual HC of their employees. Therefore, the in-formational problem at play is completely different from the one considered in the canonical signalling model. An additional difference with the previous literature is that, since we consider standard production functions where the inputs are quantities of (efficiency units of) labor of the two skills, what matters is the total supply of human capital in the different labor markets, not the average per-capita level of HC. 22 It is easy to see that one could reformulate our analysis in terms of average per capita HC by simply imposing an appropriate reinterpretation of the production technology. The results would not substantively change.
One possible interpretation of our results is as a cautionary tale. At least at the medium/high skill level, it is obvious that, by investing in different types of HC, workers self-select into distinct labor markets. This is best captured in Roy's models,or in mixed model such as the one considered here, and it has relevant empirical implications, different from the ones of the pure efficiency unit models. Under several plausible specifications of the structure of the economy, these two types of models also have different normative implications. In particular, this paper suggests the lack of robustness of the policy prescriptions obtained in pure efficiency unit models with pecuniary HC externalities.
Appendix
Given the structure of the production function, the economy essentially decomposes into two distinct sub-economies, one for each t. Therefore, in the sequel, we analyze separately, in particular, profits and surpluses obtained by the same firm using the two processes.
Let γ ≡ 1+Γ 1+Γ−α . We start solving for the competitive wages given an arbitrary pair (δ u , δ s ) and any arbitrary pair K f t = K t , for each t and f . A straightforward computation shows that, for each t, market clearing requires
Given any arbitrary threshold δ , ex-ante expected profits of firm f in sector t are
22 In the formal model, average human capital and aggregate human capital do, in fact, coincide. However, in terms of interpretation, what matters is the total human capital in each labor market and its average across different, "local", labor markets for the same skill.
Since expected profit must be zero, it must be
so that, using (A1),
Substituting it into (A1), we obtain the δ −conditional equilibrium wage map
Hence, given δ , each worker's optimal supply of HC is
and the value of the indirect utility function is
for t = s. For t = u, we obtain a similar expression. The equilibrium condition F( δ ; ξ ) = 0, eq. (1) in the text, follows immediately.
Proof of Prop. 1.
(a) Consider an arbitrary ξ , with τ s = τ u = τ and ∆T = 0. F( δ ) can be rewritten as
Pick the partition induced by any interior threshold δ . Evidently,
if and only if δ ≥ δ . Hence, any non-empty equilibrium partition satisfies
For each threshold δ , and each t, E(δ f ( δ ; ξ ) ≡ bT ≥ 0 and bT ≡ max
Then, by the intermediate value theorem, for each T such that T ∈ T , T , there is δ (ξ ) such that F(δ ; ξ ) = 0. Hence, an equilibrium exists.
Hence, the signs of the comparative statics properties, and uniqueness of equilibrium, follow immediately from the sign of
Fix (α, Γ) . The first term is strictly positive. It is easy to check that η s (δ ) ≥ 0, for
Proof of Prop. 2.
We start restricting the analysis to partitions
Fix an arbitrary pair ( K u , K s ). For each δ t , the optimal investment in HC is obtained solving
Fix an arbitrary threshold δ . Let µ t ( δ ) be the measure of the set of workers investing in skill t, given the partition induced by δ . It coincides with the measure of firms investing in physical capital of type t. 23 The optimal level of the investments in physical capital is obtained solving the optimization problem
Since (1 − α) γ < 1, the problem is strictly concave. Its optimal solution is K t ( δ ) =
(1 − α)
Conditional on the threshold, these functions coincide with the equilibrium functions computed above. Replacing K t ( δ ) and H t (δ t ; δ ), for each t, in E(W (.)) we obtain that, given any threshold δ , the maximum total expected surplus is
a continuous function. Consider now the optimization problem
Continuity implies that an optimal solution δ exists, either interior or on the boundary. Evidently, together with { K u , K s } and { H s (δ s ; δ ), H u (δ u ; δ )}, δ defines the CO allocation. We now show that an equilibrium allocation is CO if and only if δ = δ . The "if" part is obvious, since the CO levels of the investments coincide with their equilibrium values, conditional on the threshold. Assume that an CO allocation is interior. Then, it must be true that
= 0 at the equilibrium threshold δ . Consider eq. (2) in the text. We have already pointed out that, at any equilibrium δ , the term in square brackets is zero. Moreover, the last two terms are positive, since V t (δ ; δ ) is increasing in E(δ (γ−1) t | δ ) which is the expected value of a strictly increasing function of δ . Thus,
> 0. To conclude, we need to show that all the CO partitions have structure
]}, modulo some zero measure set. Assume, by contradiction, that there is a CO allocation with measurable partition ∆ with a different structure. Given any such a ∆, constrained optimality requires that, for each t, K t ( ∆) and H t (δ t ; ∆) have 23 We are implicity assuming that each firm is matched with a labor market for just one skill. This simplify the notation and it does not entail any loss of generality, given the production function. the functional form described above. Pick any pair of measurable sets B u ⊂ ∆ u and B s ⊂ ∆ s of positive, and, without loss of generality, equal measure, such that, for each pair (δ u , δ s ) ∈ B u × B s , δ u > δ s . Using (A6), it is easy to check that we can increase E(W (.)) picking another partition ∆
• with ∆
e., simply switching the two sets. Hence, modulo some zero measure set, each CO partition ∆ must have the structure that we have postulated above.
Observe that, for ∆T = 0 and τ s = τ u = τ sufficiently small,
the total utility (gross of education costs) obtained by workers in sector t.
Proof of Prop. 3.
Let ∆T = 0 and pick τ = τ s = τ u such that The map given by the equilibrium and the invariance of the tax revenues conditions is G(δ , ξ ) ≡ F(δ ; ξ ) R(δ ; ξ ) − R = 0 0 .
Consider first the balanced budget policy (dτ s , dτ u ). By the implicit function Thm.,
where we use, for instance, F τ s to denote
= 0, while the other terms are bounded away from zero, F τ s R δ − F δ R τ s < 0 for τ sufficiently small. Since, by construction, R(ξ ) is invariant,
Hence, using (A8), and τ = τ t for each t, is also positive. Therefore, for R δ (i.e., τ) sufficiently small in absolute value, ∂ E(W (ξ )) ∂ τ u F τ s R δ − F δ R τ s > 0, and, therefore, ∂ E(W (ξ )) ∂ τ u < 0, as claimed, since F τ s R δ − F δ R τ s < 0. This establishes (i) .
Let's now consider a balanced budget policy (dτ t , d∆) . By direct computation,   
∂ ∆T Consider the policy (−dτ u , d∆T ) >> 0. For τ = τ t for each t, and sufficiently small, (ξ ) ) .
Given that
δ (ξ ) γ−1 E(δ [29] Swinkels, J.M., 1999, Education signalling with preemptive offers, Review of
